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THE COPYRIGHT CONUNDRUM IN MODERN
TECHNOLOGY COPYRIGHT ISSUES REGARDING
INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS AND LIVE
SPECTATOR SPORT EVENTS
John J. Leppler*
INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a worldwide system of interconnected network con-
stantly expanding. Since the 1990s, the United States tried to regulate
the internet, but Congress has yet to find a solution to stopping In-
ternet piracy and copyright infringement.' As a remedial measure,
Congress enacted the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA").2 The DMCA was enacted to protect copyright owners
for original work of authorship and Internet service providers
("ISPs,") from infringement lawsuits; however, the act has only suc-
ceeded in the latter thus limiting ISPs' legal liability for copyright in-
fringement claims. The Internet and technological advancements
make it relatively simple to upload copyrighted works, but fail to ac-
count for the rights of the copyright holder.3
Courts have determined that ISPs should constantly be held ac-
countable against original copyright holders for piracy actions, yet the
courts have been reluctant in finding any liability.4 The most recent
decision is Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, where Viacom sued
the leading video-sharing site owned by Google alleging that YouT-
tube engaged in "brazen and massive" copyright infringement by al-
lowing users to upload and view thousands of videos owned by
* John Leppler is a 2014 JD Candidate at the University of Baltimore School of Law.
1. Jennette Wiser et al., The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The Future of the Safe Harbor
Provision, 1 PACE. INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ErNr. L.F. 25,29 (2011), available at http://digitalcom
mons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=pipself.
2. Carolyn Andrepont, Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Copyright Protections For the Dig-
ital Age, 9 J. Art & Ent. L. 397, 407 (1999). David Balaban, Music in the Digital Millennium: The
Effects of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 7 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 311, 323 (2000)
3. Id.
4. Lynelle J. Slivinski, Copyright Infringement-in Determining Whether or Not A Copyright
License Is Exclusive or Nonexclusive, Courts Should Look Beyond the Parties' Original Agree-
ment and Consider Their Subsequent Actions: Jacob Maxwell, Inc., 8 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 719
(1998).
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Viacom without permission.5 In 2010, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted Youtube's owner Google
Inc.'s motion for summary judgment against Viacom. 6 Viacom then
appealed the summary judgment ruling to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and on April 18, 2013, the Second Cir-
cuit's Judge Stanton again granted summary judgment in favor of
Google Inc.7 Judge Stanton ultimately upheld that "low threshold"
ISPs must meet for protection under the DMCA's "safe harbor" pro-
visions from copyright infringement.8 Viacom has appealed the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision and the case is currently pending.9
Copyright challenges by holders against ISPs are mainly for music
and entertainment.' 0 There are two grounds that live spectator sports
events have yet to be challenged on." First, a court has yet to deter-
mine whether a live spectator sports event is copyrightable by a sta-
dium, arena, or teams.12 Second, a court has yet to distinguish what
activities are within the scope of what "reasonably occurs" during a
live sports event.13 "Facts" and "news" are non-copyrightable under
the First Amendment, so distinguishing these occurrences from
"sports events related activates" are important for copyright
distinction. 14
Part II of this article summarizes the 1998 DMCA and its "safe har-
bor" provisions in relation to ISPs. Further, this section will discuss
recent case law that demonstrates the "low threshold" that ISPs must
meet to be granted protection through the DMCA "safe harbor"
provisions.
5. Jing Xu, DMCA Safe Harbors and the Future of New Digital Music Sharing Platforms, 11
Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 145, 147 (2012) available at April 1 2012, at 145, 152-54.
6. Opinion and Order Granting Summary Judgment that Defendant Youtube Qualifies for
Protection of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) Against all of Plaintiffs' Claims for Direct and Secondary Copy-
right Infringement" Docket Alarm, Inc. Retrieved May 9, 2013.
7. Granting Defendant YouTube's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment; Entering Judg-
ment that Defendants are Protected by the Safe-Harbor Provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) from all of Plaintiffs Copyright Infringement Claims.". Docket
Alarm, Inc. April 18, 2013. Retrieved May 9, 2013.
8. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2012).
9. "Docket Information for Viacom v. Youtube" Retrieved May 9, 2013.
10. Cheryl L. Slay, Myspace or Whose Space? Digital Millenium Copyright Act's Impact on
Web Sites, Md. B.J., January/February 2008, at 16.
11. Michael McCann, Who Can Watch Fan-Filmed Videos of the Daytona Nationwide Wreck?
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 24, 2013, 6:35 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/racing/news/2013
0224/nascar-nationwide-wreck-videos/.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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Part III of this article addresses the legal issue in determining what
content is "facts" or "news" both of which are non-copyrightable
under the First Amendment, and distinguishing those from a "live
spectator sports event." A copyright owner, one who owns an exclu-
sive copyright license, is the only person or entity who may sue an ISP
for copyright infringement.15 It is unclear whether a stadium, arena,
or team would own a copyright uploaded by a spectator onto an ISP.16
This section will analyze a legal issue that is split amongst the United
States Circuits regarding who the correct copyright holder is of a
taped and uploaded segment of a live sports event- the sport's gov-
erning body or the spectator who filmed the segment.
Internet expansion is a mainstay, and telling people not to bring cell
phones to live sporting events is a virtual impossibility. Monetizing
uploaded and downloaded content will decrease potential lawsuits
that may arise from copyright-protected content. The "safe harbor
provisions" in the DMCA has afforded ISPs a "low threshold" to
meet to be protected from copyright infringement.17 The lobbied
ideas of Internet insurance and an "Internet fund" may mutually ben-
efit the ISPs and copyright holders, but this article concludes showing
why courts must give definitive answers to certain legal questions
before creating financial models that mutually benefits ISP expansion
and copyright protection.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of American Copyright Law
Copyright is protection provided by United States' Federal law to
authors of "original works of authorship," including literary, dramatic,
musical, artistic, and certain other intellectual works.18 This protec-
tion is available to both published and unpublished works.19 Section
106 of the Copyright Act, amended in 1976, gives the owner of the
copyright work the exclusive right to do and to authorize others to
15. Adler Vermillion & Skocilich,LLP: Business and Intellectual Property lawyers in NYC
and Seattle. Copyright Codex: A Free Digital Treatise. 22. Plaintiffs (Standing); Non-Exclusive
License Can Not Sue (citing Ocasek v. Hegglund, 116 F.R.D. 154 (D. Wyo. 1987); Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS Inc., 421 F. Supp. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). www.copyrightcodex.comlenforce
ment-toc/22-plaintiffs.
16. See Wiser supra note I at 31.
17. Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Social Networking Web Sites and the Dmca: A
Safe-Harbor from Copyright Infringement Liability or the Perfect Storm?, 6 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell.
Prop. 1, 4 (2007). CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004)
18. Robert A. Gorman, An Overview of the Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 856,
857 (1978).
19. Id. at 865.
1072014]1
108 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 10:105
reproduce the work in copies or phonograph records, prepare deriva-
tive works based upon the owner's work, distribute copies of the work
in any form to the public by sale, and to perform the owner's work
publicly in literature, motion picture, pantomime, musical, and other
audiovisual forms of the work.20
Copyright protection exists from the time the work is created in
fixed form. 2 1 The copyright in the work of the authorship immedi-
ately becomes the legal property of the author who created the
work. 22 An exception would be a "work for hire," where the employer
or commission party is the owner.23 Only the author or those deriving
their rights through the author can lawfully claim copyright. 24 How-
ever, two parties can expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
both that the original work is owned by one or the other as the sole
copyright holder.25 The parties can contract the time, form and dura-
tion of the original work protected by copyright, with the rest of the
work considered "fair use." 26
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") is a federal stat-
ute that criminalizes the production and dissemination of technology,
devices, or services intended to circumvent measures that control ac-
cess to copyrighted works of "authorship." 2 7 The DMCA heightens
the penalties for copyright infringement by the Internet.28
20. Id. at 857
21. See McCann, supra note 9. Reid, 490 U.S. at 737 (citing 17 U.S.C. s 102). Reid, 490 U.S. at
737 (citing 17 U.S.C. s 102). Russ Versteeg, Defining "Author" for Purposes of Copyright, 45
Am. U. L. Rev. 1323, 1366 (1996)
22. KESEY, LLC, an Oregon Limited Liability Company, Plaintiff, v. Michele FRANCIS aka
Mischelle Mcmindes, an individual; Mike Hagen, an individual; Katherine Wilson, an individual;
Sundown & Fletcher, Inc.; an Oregon corporation; Associates Film Producers Services, an Ore-
gon partnership or other business entity; and Does I through 100, inclusive, Defendants., 2008
WL 4155948 (D.Or.) Under certain narrowly-defined conditions, however, the "author" of a
work is deemed to be the employer or commissioning party of the person who created the work,
but only if it is a "work for hire," which requires: (1) a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned . . . if the
parties expressly agreerd] in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be consid-
ered a work made for hire. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 737-38; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphases added).
23. See Id.
24. Id.
25. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 113 L.
Ed. 2d 358 (1991)
26. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
27. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27. .
28. Id.
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1. Internet Service Providers under the DMCA
For a party to be immune from copyright infringement liability
under the DMCA's "safe harbor" provision, the party must first be
considered an ISP. A service provider is defined under Section
512(k)(1)(A) of the DMCA as "an entity offering the transmission,
routing, or providing of connections for digital online communica-
tions, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the
user's choosing, without modification of the content of the material as
sent or received." 29 An ISP is a provider of "online services or net-
work access, or the operator of facilities."30 The definition appears
narrow, but the Courts have interpreted the meaning of an "ISP"
broadly.3' The cases Viacom v. Youtube32 and Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Cybernet Ventures, Inc.33 first demonstrate a the courts' reluctance to
broadly interpret an ISP under the DMCA "safe harbor provisions,
but since such cases, broader interpretation of whether ISP is entitled
to the "safe harbor" provisions have been applied. 34 Two recent cases,
The Football Association Premier League Ltd. Et. Al v. Youtube
(2012) and Capital Records, Inc. v. MO3tunes, LLC (2013,) show
lower courts have considered any website that stores, sends or re-
ceives electronic information but does not modify the information, an
ISP.35 The Youtube and Perfect 10 decisions are regularly scrutinized
amongst legal scholars, but in those cases the courts held that an ISP
regularly performs these four activities:
1. Transitory communication;
2. System caching;
3. Storage of information on systems or networks at the direction of
users; or
4. Information location tools. 3 6
29. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West, 2010).
30. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) affd in part,
vacated in part, remanded, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012)
31. Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine Should
Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2013).
32. Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) affd in part,
vacated in part, remanded, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
33. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
34. The Football Association Premier League Ltd. et al v. YouTube Inc., et al., 2012 WL
1130851(2d Cir., April 5, 2012); Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 07 Civ. 9931 (S.D.N.Y.
May. 14, 2013).
35. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 07 Civ. 9931 (S.D.N.Y. May. 14, 2013).
36. See Wiser, supra Note 1 at 38. See also The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, U.S.
Copyright Office Summary, 8 (Dec. 1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf.
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Once a service provider has met the qualifications and is classified
as to have engaged in the above four conducts, that entity is then clas-
sified as an ISP under the DMCA and can only be immune from copy-
right infringement by meeting the standards under section 512(i).37
The ISP must also (1) adopt and reasonably implement a policy of
terminating, in appropriate circumstances, the accounts of subscribers
who are repeat infringers; and (2) accommodate and not interfere
with 'standard technical measures.' 38 Courts have further broken
down both conditions into separate tests or interpretations:
The first condition has been broken down into three requirements.
The ISP must: (1) adopt a policy that provides for the termination of
access to service for repeat copyright infringers in appropriate circum-
stances (2) implement that policy in a reasonable manner and (3) in-
form its subscribers of the policy.39
The second condition, standard technical measures, is defined as,
"measures that copyright owner[s] use to identify or protect copy-
righted works, that have been developed under a broad consensus of
copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair and voluntary
multi-industry process, are available to anyone on reasonable nondis-
criminatory terms, and do not impose substantial costs or burdens on
service providers." 40
Even if the provider is an ISP under the DMCA, three conditions
must be met for the ISP to be given immunity from copyright infringe-
ment liability:
1. The provider must not have the requisite level of knowledge of
the infringing activity;
2. If the provider has the right and ability to control the infringing
activity, it must not receive a financial benefit directly attributa-
ble to the infringing activity; and
3. Upon receiving the proper notification of the claimed copyright
infringement, the ISP must expeditiously take down or block ac-
cess to the material.41
If the "knowledge" condition is met, it is hard to argue that an ISP
would have actual or apparent knowledge of infringing material and
37. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, supra note 33 at 9.
38. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004).
39. Breen, supra note 32 at 161-62, quoting Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir.
2004).
40. See Wiser, supra Note 1 at 39.
41. Breen, supra note 32 at 165-66. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (1998).
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financially benefit from that material on its website. 4 2 The "knowl-
edge" element is either "actual" or "apparent." Under Section
512(A) of the DMCA, an ISP will not be liable for copyrighted mate-
rial on its website, uploaded by a third party user if the ISP:
(i) Does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system or network is infringing; or
(ii) Absent such actual knowledge, the ISP is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent. 43
Courts have construed a narrow meaning of "actual knowledge,"
having interpreted it as "definitive and confirmed" knowledge of spe-
cific copyright protected content on its server.44 On the other hand,
an ISP's "general knowledge" as opposed to "actual," of copyright
protected material on its server immunes the ISP from copyright in-
fringement liability. 45 Courts have yet to determine the "knowledge"
requirement for ISPs when a copyright owner provides notice of copy-
right protected content on their server. Contrarily after notice is
given, the ISP has an "affirmative duty" to search for that content and
take "reasonable measures" to block or take down the content. 46
42. Liliana Chang, The Red Flag Test for Apparent Knowledge Under the DMCA § 512(c)
Safe Harbor, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 203 (2010). See also Capitol Records, Inc. v.
MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (A website's use of the terms "free,"
"mp3," or "file-sharing" was not tantamount to "red flag" knowledge of infringement that would
disqualify an Internet service provider from safe harbor protection under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA); terms were ubiquitous among legitimate sites offering legitimate ser-
vices.) See also 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 512(c)(1)(A), (d)(1) (West, 2010).
43. Arista Records, LLC v. Usenet.com, 633 F. Supp. 2d 124,142 (2d Cir. 2010) (Recording
companies brought action against operators of file distribution service that made music available
for download, alleging direct infringement of exclusive right of distribution, inducement of copy-
right infringement, contributory copyright infringement, and vicarious copyright infringement.
Plaintiffs moved for termination due to discovery abuse, and cross-motions for summary judg-
ment were filed. The District Court, Harold Baer, Jr., J., held that imposition of sanction pre-
cluding operators from asserting affirmative defense of protection under DMCA's safe harbor
provision was warranted for discovery abuse and that the operators actively engaged in conduct
which allowed direct infringement of recording companies' copyrights.)
44. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2009) aff'd
sub nom. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011).
The fact that internet video-sharing website hosted an entire category of content-music-that was
subject to copyright protection did not establish that website had actual knowledge of infringe-
ment, as required to prove website was not entitled to coverage under safe harbor provision of
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (West 2010).
45. Viacom,676 F.3d at 31.(Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe har-
bor, the difference between actual and red flag knowledge is not between specific and genera-
lized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an objective standard; in other words, the
actual knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or "subjectively" knew of
specific infringement).
46. See Wiser, supra note 1 at 43.
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Although the ISP lacks actual knowledge, it may know facts or cir-
cumstances that establish "apparent" knowledge of the copyrighted
content on its server which would satisfy the knowledge requirement
as well. 4 7 Determining if an ISP has apparent knowledge is also
known as the "red flag" test.4 8 This test has a subjective and an objec-
tive element; the subjective relates to the ISP and the objective de-
pends on "whether the copyrighted material on the ISP would have
been apparent to a reasonable person operating under similar circum-
stances." 4 9 If a court finds that there is a subjective or objective ele-
ment, then apparent knowledge is found, and the ISP is therefore
liable for copyright infringement.
II. DISCUSSION
A. "Facts" and " News" Under the First Amendment in Relation
to Live Sports Events
In 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals in NBA v. Motorola Inc. never
addressed whether live sports events are awarded copyright protec-
tion, but considered occurrences during live sports events not granted
copyright protection.5 0 The defendant, Motorola Inc., provided a ser-
vice that allowed parties to get the scores of NBA games while the
game was in progress.5 1 There was a lag of two to three minutes be-
tween the events of the games and when the information appeared on
the pager screen.5 2 When the NBA gained knowledge of Motorola's
transmission of "hot news" material of their professional basketball
games to direct Motorola subscribers over the phone, the NBA sough
a permanent injunction against Motorola, which the District Court
granted against Motorola for transmitting the NBA scores to their
subscribers. 53 Motorola appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, where it reversed the district court's deci-
sion and held that Motorola did not commit copyright infringement
and NBA stats and scores did not meet the constitutional and statu-
tory requirements required for copyright protection. 54 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit said,
47. Supra note 1 at 42.
48. See Viacom, 676 F.3d 19.
49. See Id. at 29-31.
50. Id. NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
51. Id. at 843.
52. Id at 844.
53. Id. at 852.
54. Id. at,854. .
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"Hot-news" misappropriation claim that survives preemption under
Copyright Act is limited to cases where: plaintiff generates or gath-
ers information at a cost; information is time sensitive; defendant's
use of information constitutes free ride on plaintiff's efforts; defen-
dant is in direct competition with product or service offered by
plaintiff; and ability of other parties to free ride on efforts of plain-
tiff and others would so reduce incentive to produce product or ser-
vice its existence or quality would be substantially threatened.55
Therefore, professional basketball games were not "original works
of authorship" entitled to copyright protection."5 6
The final sentence of the Second Circuit's Opinion raises an impor-
tant legal question which courts have not yet addressed. The Second
Circuit held that "professional basketball" is not an "original work of
authorship," and neither are the games' statistics and scores.57 Specta-
tors and teams alike are weary about going to the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office to certify a copyright over live spectator
sports events.58 Courts have yet to rule on this issue and this impor-
tant a legal question remains unanswered.
B. Questions Unanswered in Copyright Law's Relationship
to Live Sport Events
A copyright protects literary, musical, pictorial, graphic or sculp-
tured works, motion pictures, and other audiovisual works, sound re-
cordings, and architectural works from being reproduced, distributed,
revised, or publicly performed or displayed without the permission of
the copyright owner or as otherwise permitted by law.59 The original
work created by the person is protected however the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution protects "facts" and "news" as
long as they are not in the "featured trend or arrangement as the orig-
inal person's authored work." 60 Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tele-
phone Service Company ("Feist Publications") illustrates the court's
55. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301, Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
We hold that the surviving "hot-news" INS-like claim is limited to cases where: (i) a plaintiff
generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the information is time-sensitive; (iii) a defen-
dant's use of the information constitutes free riding on the plaintiff's efforts; (iv) the defendant is
in direct competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiffs; and (v) the ability of
other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to
produce the product or service that its existence or quality would be substantially threatened.
We conclude that SportsTrax does not meet that test. Id. at 845 (2d Cir. 1997, citing, International
News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S.Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211 (1918).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). Section 102(a) Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841,
846 (2d Cir. 1997).
57. Id.
58. See generally McCann, supra note 9
59. 17 U.S.C. § 102, COPYRIGHT LAW, IPPRAC MA-CLE 7-1.
60. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,(1991).
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allowance of "fair use" and the First Amendment's protection of
"facts" and "news" from copyright. 61 In Feist Publications, a tele-
phone utility company brought a copyright infringement action
against a publisher of an area-wide telephone directory for the pub-
lisher's use of listings in the utility's local white pages. 62 The case
reached the U.S. Supreme Court and the Court held that the sub-
stance in the telephone book's white pages could not have copyright
protection.63
Segments of live spectator sports events that are considered "facts"
or "news" were not protected by copyright law; this was contested in
2009 when a spectator at a soccer game in the United Kingdom filmed
a 37 second video on his phone of footage of the soccer game, and
uploaded it on YouTube. 64 The following day YouTube took the video
down, and when the spectator was asked about YouTube's rationale,
he knew the football (soccer in America) leagues in the United King-
dom were angered over their content being "web-cast." 65 A webcast
is a transmission of media over the Internet using streaming technol-
ogy, it is essentially "Internet broadcasting." 66
This incident has legal questions that courts have left unanswered.
First, whether a live spectator sports event is awarded copyright pro-
tection, and second, since live spectator sports events in the United
States are copyright protected, which occurrences during these events
are "facts" or "news" and, therefore, not copyright protected?
C. Application of Current Copyright Law Precedent to An
Uploaded Youtube Video of a Live Spectator Sports Event
In 2013, U.S. legal scholars analyzed the copyright issue of the 2009
United Kingdom incident, when a spectator at NASCAR's Daytona
500 filmed parts of the race. 67 The video was one minute and sixteen
seconds long; thirteen seconds of the actual race (the cars racing
against each other around the track) and one minute and three
seconds of a car crash with debris floating around the track and
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 363-64.
64. Mike Masnick, Can A Sports Organization Claim Copyright On Stuff you Filmed Your-
self? TciiDRT (April 24, 2009 6:43 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20090420/0257124562
.shtml.
65. Supra.
66. Pannee Suanpang: Facutltry of Science and Technology Suan Dusit Rejabhat University,
Walter Kalceff, Faculty f Science, University of Technology Sydney. San Dusit Internet Broad-
casting (SDIB):- Educational Innovation in Thailand. http://editlib.org/noaccess/28444.
67. McCann, supra note 9.
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screaming fans.68 YouTube took down the video immediately at the
request of NASCAR, but NASCAR at the time never filed for legal
copyrights of the video.69 Before uploading the video to YouTube, the
spectator did not notify the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice to establish himself as the copyright holder of his video, neither
did NASCAR at the time they requested YouTube to take the video
down.7 0
In one respect, NASCAR could argue that because the spectator
filmed the one minute and sixteen second segment inside of Daytona
500 arena, where the spectator needed a ticket to enter, the entry into
the event from the ticket stated that NASCAR owns all intellectual
property of their event.71 However, this is not definitive for a retrans-
mission or rebroadcast of the live events over another venue, and in a
different time place or form. In the 1997 case Chicago Professional
Sports Partnership v. NBA, a professional team and television net-
work sued the NBA, claiming the contract between the NBA and the
broadcast network was an unreasonable restraint of trade.72 The Dis-
trict Court held that the nominal transfer to league of game copyrights
held by individual teams did not immunize league from antitrust
laws.73 This shows courts recognize the ability of third parties to
reproduce live sports events in their own form, whether at a different
time over the television or in "game track"-following the game
through statistics and scores rather than watching the basketball play-
ers perform.7 4
Another issue courts must address is the contractual relationship
between spectators and sports leagues and its respective, sanctioning
bodies. A contract is a binding agreement between parties as long as
each party mutually assents to the agreement, and there exists an of-
fer,75 acceptance,'76 and consideration.77 However, it is common in
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Chi Prof' Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 874 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ill. 1995) vacated, 95 F.3d 593
(7th Cir. 1996).
73. Id.
74. Chi Prof'1 Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 874 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ill. 1995) vacated, 95 F.3d 593
(7th Cir. 1996). See also David L. Pratt II, Fantasy Sports and the Right of Publicity: A Case for
Viewing Dissemination of Player Statistics As Fair Use of the News, 13 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 215,
216 (2006).
75. Johnson v. Whitney Metal Tool Co., 96 N.E.2d 372, 376-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950) (Unless the
offeror limits the time for an offeree to accept, an offer is generally open until it is accepted or
rejected, provided that an answer is given within a reasonable time. An offeree's acceptance
after the time period has extinguished, or an offeree's lack of response in absence of an express
limitation will not bind offeror).
2014] 115
116 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 10:105
business transactions for one party to have greater bargaining power
due to its superior position over the other party. As long as the par-
ties mutually, freely, and voluntarily assent to the terms, the contracts
will likely be enforceable.78 A property right gives the owner the
"right to exclude" anyone from entering the property or acting in cer-
tain ways on that property.79 Stated another way, a person is granted a
possessory right to real property, which includes the right to exclude
and the right to enjoy the property.80 Further, if a third party behaves
in such a way that adversely affects the owner's ability to exclude
others and enjoy his property, these distinct property interests allow
the owner to bring causes of action respectively of trespass and nui-
sance against such third party who infringed on the owner's property
rights.8'
Unless the ticket to enter the sports event expressly states that the
sanctioning body of the event owns the Intellectual Property rights to
it, spectators may create their own work of authorship by filming parts
of the event on a mobile device as a paid ticket holder.82
In American Copyright jurisprudence, the copyright of an original
work attaches at the moment the work of authorship is created, but in
76. Cheverie v. Geisser, 783 So. 2d 1115, 1119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) ("Generally, the
acceptance of an offer which results in a contract must be absolute and unconditional, identical
with the terms of the offer, and in the mode, at the place, and within the time expressly or
impliedly stated within the offer; thus, an acceptance must contain an assent to the same matters
contained in the offer").
77. Margeson v. Artis, 776 N.W. 2d 652, 655 (Iowa 2009) ("Generally, the element of consider-
ation ensures the promise sought to be enforced was bargained for and given in exchange for a
reciprocal promise or an act").
78. Hanson v. Maxfield, 23 So. 3d 736,739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) ("The making of a con-
tract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two
sets of external signs; not on the parties having meant the same thing but on their having said the
same thing").
79. Bresnik v. Beulah Park Ltd. P'ship, Inc., 617 N.E.2d 1096 (Sup. Ct. Ohio 1993) (Racetrack
owner had common-law property right to exclude jockey agent from its business premises. This
right was not abrogated or abolished by statute permitting racing commission to exclude jockey
agents from racetracks or by rules authorizing track stewards to do so; these statutes and rules
supplemented common law by extending this common-law right held by racetrack owners to
commission and to stewards).
80. Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 237 Mich. App. 51, 602 N.W.2d 215 (1999).
81. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (addressing as separate "attributes of ownership" the rights of exclusion, alienation, and
enjoyment); Biggs v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 632 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980) (" 'title to
real property . . . is nothing more than a bundle of potential causes of action: for trespass, to
quiet title, for interference with quiet enjoyment, and so on.' " Quoting Starker v. United States,
602 F.2d 1341, 1355 (9th Cir. 1979); Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 218
(1999).
82. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir.
1986).
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order for a copyright owner to bring an action for copyright infringe-
ment, the author must first register the copyright.83 Therefore, the
sports event spectator could argue that because the video was re-
corded on his mobile device, the recording qualifies as an "original
work of art," and belongs exclusively to the spectator. Further, the
First Amendment acts as a safeguard for facts and news.84 "Facts" and
"news" by themselves may not be copyrighted because the person or
entity merely discovered the content rather than created the content
into their own original and descriptive form.85 It was therefore rea-
sonable for the spectator and NASCAR to never contact the United
States Patent and Trademark Office for copyright registration. 86 Both
parties were uncertain as to who owned the copyright to the one min-
ute and sixteen second video.87 Would the one minute and thirteen
seconds of the car crash and screaming fans be considered "facts" or
"news" so the spectator would own that portion, leaving NASCAR
with ownership to the copyright of the thirteen remaining seconds of
race footage?
D. Legal Implications of the DMCA Act and Copyright Ownership
of Live Spectator Sports Events
The DMCA discussed in Part II of this article gives Internet Service
Providers broad means of satisfying the safe harbor provision in the
act; making itself immune from a majority of copyright infringement
claims. The Internet Service Provider must have "actual" or "appar-
ent" knowledge of the infringing material on its site in order to be
held liable for infringement. 8 ("General" knowledge has been deter-
mined by the court to not be enough to hold an ISP liability for copy-
right infringement).89
83. 17 U.S.C.A. H§ 102(a), 411(a), 501(b). Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282,1289 (11th Cir.
1999); BUC Int'l Corp. v. Int'l Yacht Council Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129 (11th Cir. 2007).
84. McCann, supra note 9. See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 33 L. Ed.
2d 626 (1972)
85. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (internet service provider's stor-
age of copyright infringer's posts on its USENET servers for fourteen days constituted "interme-
diate and transient storage" that was not "maintained on system or network for longer period
than is reasonably necessary for transmission, routing, or provision of connections," within
meaning of Digital Millennium Copyright Act's safe-harbor provision).
86. McCann, supra note 9.
87. Id.
88. Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) on
reconsideration in part, 07 CIV. 9931 WHP, 2013 WL 1987225 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2013).
89. Wiser, Luciano, Psihoules, Lopez. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The Future of
the Safe Harbor Provision. Pace IP., Sports & Entertainment L. Form. Vol. 1, Issue 1 Spring
2011 Art. 3. http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=pipself.
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Cell phones and other technological advancements raise further is-
sues that are detrimental to future sports sanctioning bodies if courts
do not decide definitively on two issues:
1) Who is the correct copyright holder of a live sports event if a
spectator films segments of their event with a cellphone?
2) Even if certain segments of the live sports events may be consid-
ered "facts" or "news" rather than part of the live sports event
(a car crash at a NASCAR race), will this be considered part of
the live sports events?90
If a court addresses the first issue it may analyze the Intellectual
Property protections recognized to sports leagues and sanctioning
bodies--disclaimers on the back of live sports events tickets and the
fact that the sports leagues and sanctioning bodies are providing the
entertainment for the events.9' A court will weigh those protections
against copyright protections awarded to spectator filming a segment
of the event on their cell phone, since the spectator's copyright at-
taches at the moment the filmed segment is created. 92 The second con-
dition is a classic, legal, slippery slope, weighing perhaps in favor of
the spectator owning the copyrighted material as a whole.
Courts should take a case-by-case approach in determining what
circumstances should encompass "regular instances of a particular
sport," and establish a set of rules for each particular sport. If the
created "work of authorship" is only a segment of the live sporting
event with no small section of "facts" or "news" in that segment, then
the interests of the sports sanctioning bodies outweighs the interests
of the spectator. Therefore, the sanctioning bodies most likely own
that copyright. Unlike in NBA v. Motorola where statistics and scores
were the only information re-broadcasted over the Internet, the spec-
tator here filmed a segment of cars racing at full speed on his cell
phone, uploaded it onto a computer, and re-broadcasted it over the
Internet.93 The First Amendment safeguard of "facts" and "news"
most likely outweighs the competing interest a sports sanctioning
body would have in the video, as long as the video was a compilation
of both the live sports event, "facts," and "news." 94
90. McCann, supra note 9.
91. Id. See also Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 850 (2d Cir. 1997).
92. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm't Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 877 (9th Cir. 2005). See
also Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2007).
93. McCann, supra note 9. See also Nat'I Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 850
(2d Cir. 1997).
94. Pac. & S. Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499 (11th Cir. 1984). The fact that the
infringing tape was the only copy of copyrighted television news broadcast still in existence did
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The problem is the "low threshold" ISPs must meet to receive im-
munity from copyright infringement under the DMCA's safe harbor
provision.95 If an ISP meets this threshold, it is free of any liability for
any infringing content on its server, as long as the ISP was not put on
notice by the copyright holder of potential infringement. 96 Or, if it was
put on notice, it took reasonable measures to "expeditiously" take
down or block the content.97 Viacom v. Youtube illustrates the court's
reluctance to hold an ISP liable for copyright infringement when the
ISP takes reasonable steps to remove the material once it has "actual"
or "apparent" knowledge of the copyright protected content.98
The Perfect 10 Court made two important determinations; one af-
fecting a copyright owner and the other affecting an ISP. First, a copy-
right owner's notice to an ISP is effective, within the meaning of
DMCA, if it substantially fulfills the statutory requirements under
Section 512(c)(3)(A). 99 Absolute compliance with the statutory provi-
sion is not required if the copyright owner substantially fulfills the re-
quirements set forth.100 Second, once the ISP receives such notice, it
need not find the specific person responsible for the copyright in-
fringement, but must reasonably implement its termination policy to
protect itself from future, potential copyright infringement claims.10
Courts have narrowed the scope of ISP liability and their relationship
with the DMCA. Courts have determined ISPs' infringement liability
to be: (1) the "knowledge" of the commercial benefit the ISPs derive
at the detriment of the copyright holder, and (2) whether the ISPs
not nullify the copyright, because the statute requires only that the original work be "fixed" for a
period of more than transitory duration and not for the entire term of the copyright.
95. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007).
96. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004).
97. Ivan Hoffman, The Notice And Take Down Provisions Of The DMCA. http://www.ivan
hoffman.com/dmca.html. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 (W.D.
Wash. 2004).
98. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). Under the common law
vicarious liability standard, the ability to block infringers' access of to a particular environment
for any reason is evidence of the right and ability to supervise.
99. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2010); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077
(C.D. Cal. 2004) affd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 481 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2007) opinion
amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) and affd in part, rev'd
in part and remanded, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007)
100. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (C.D. Cal. 2004) affd in part, rev'd
in part and remanded, 481 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2007) opinion amended and superseded on denial of
reh'g, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) and aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 488 F.3d 1102
(9th Cir. 2007)
101. 512(c)(3)(A)(ii) and (iii); Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1089
(C.D. Cal. 2004) aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 481 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2007) opinion
amended and superseded on denial of reh'g, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007) and aff'd in part, rev'd
in part and remanded, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007)
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have tried to "induce" third party users to continue to distribute the
content to other users.102 Courts will first determine whether the ISP
is a centralized or decentralized server, and will then analyze the "in-
ducing conduct" for future piracy towards its users. 103
E. The Court's Reasoning in A&M Records v. Napster in
Determining whether an ISP is Centralized
of Decentralized
Napster Inc. began as a peer-to-peer ("P2P") company launched in
1999. Napster's software connected users by using a centralized
server.104 Users uploaded a file to the Napster database, allowing
other users to download the file from the central server.105 Napster
had over sixty million users who actively contributed and it was reluc-
tant to decline any file distributed by its users to its central server.106
Napster included a central server that indexed connected users and
files available on their machines, creating a searchable list of music
available across Napster's network.107 Napster quickly became a pop-
ular service for music loves to find and download quickly digital song
files for no charge. 08 Fearful of the economic loss of approximately $3
billion, the recording industry sued Napster for copyright infringe-
ment.109 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision and en-
joined Napster from running its software distribution business. 10
A subsequent case dealt with a decentralized P2P review file-shar-
ing system."' In MGM Studies v. Grokster Ltd. ("Grokster,") a ser-
vice provider, Grokster Ltd., ("Grokster") allowed users to connect
and trade files with each other, thus eliminating a need for a central-
ized server.1 2 The district court held in favor of the software distribu-
102. Courtney Macavinta, Recording Industry Sues Music Start-Up, Cites Black Market,
CNET (Dec. 7, 1999), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-234092.html.
103. Id.
104. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001).
105. Id.
106. Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive: Can the Recording Industry Survive Peer-to-Peer?, 26
Colum. J.L. & Arts 371 (2003).
107. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
108. Janelle Brown, MP3 free-for-all, Salon (Feb 3, 2000).
109. Id.
110. A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1029.
111. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (C.D.
Cal. 2003). [hereinafter Grokster I.]; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1160 ("The Copyright Owners al-
lege that over 90% of the files exchanged through use of the 'peer- to-peer' file-sharing software
offered by the Software Distributors [defendants] involves copyrighted material . . .
112. Id.
THE COPYRIGHT CONUNDRUM
tors after the recording industry brought suit again.113 The record
industry sued Grokster. Similar to the claim they sued Napster under
for copyright infringement.1 1 4 The Ninth Circuit found Grokster not
liable for copyright infringement, and distinguished Grokster's behav-
ior from Napster. 15  Grokster's software utilized a decentralized
server that connected users to each another in order to exchange files,
while Napster used a centralized server that connected users directly
to files.1 16 While both software servers are peer-to-peer networks, a
decentralized network avoids liability due to its passive server struc-
ture.11 7 The Court in Grokster reasoned that the company, unlike in
Sony, had no control over its users' conduct when the infringing con-
duct occurred." 8 Because Grokster's server allowed any user to
upload any material-infringing or not-Grokster could not be held
liable for contributory copyright infringement.' 19 The Chief Judge for
the Ninth Circuit in his opinion stated that the infringement liability of
the ISP server, even if it is a decentralized server, depends on the
knowledge that the ISP has over its users uploading infringing mate-
rial. If the ISP failed to act after having received that "knowledge," it
would most likely be liable for copyright infringement.120
Even though only ten percent of the files exchanged amongst Grok-
ster's users were "non-infringing," the court ruled this satisfied the
"substantial or commercially significant non-infringing use" require-
ment.121 Further, the court held MGM must show that Grokster had
"reasonable knowledge" of specific infringement and failed to act on
113. Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162 ("[Tihe copyright owners were required to establish that the
Software Distributors had 'specific knowledge of infringement at a time at which they contrib-
uted to the infringement, and failed to act upon that information.'") (alteration in original)
(quoting Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1030.
114. Id.
115. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035; Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1160 ("The Copyright Own-
ers allege that over 90% of the files exchanged through use of the 'peer- to-peer' file-sharing
software offered by the Software Distributors [defendants] involves copyrighted material . . . .").
116. Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162 ("[T]he copyright owners were required to establish that the
Software Distributors had 'specific knowledge of infringement at a time at which they contrib-
uted to the infringement, and failed to act upon that information.'") (alteration in original)
(quoting Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1030.
117. Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1038 ("The question, however, is whether actual knowl-
edge of specific infringement accrues at a time when either [d]efendant materially contributes to
the alleged infringement, and can therefore do something about it.").
118. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
119. Id. at 1038.
120. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
121. Id at 1038. ("The question, however, is whether actual knowledge of specific infringe-
ment accrues at a time when either defendant materially contributes to the alleged infringement,
and can therefore do something about it.").
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that knowledge to prevent infringement.12 2 In determining whether
Grokster failed to act on its "reasonable knowledge," the Ninth Cir-
cuit focused on when it received notice from copyright owners of the
infringing activity.123 The court said Grokster received knowledge af-
ter it submitted copyright infringing material, and could take no action
until after the infringing conduct occurred.124 Grokster allowed its
users to exchange files, even if Grokster's internal software was shut
down; destroying the point of disallowing users to view infringed ma-
terial via the Internet for free. 125 The court further held even though
the company received profits from advertising, imposing vicarious lia-
bility was improper.126 Grokster never stated it would control users or
their conduct. The burden is on the copyright owner to show that the
peer-to-peer server had the right of control over its users.127 Because
MGM failed to show this fact, Grokster was immune from copyright
infringement liability.128
F. Application of the "Inducement TheQry" to ISPs Distribution
of Live Sports Events
Previously, ISPs had to have "knowledge" before it could be held
liable for copyright infringement.129 The Ninth Circuit's "reasonable
knowledge" inquiry would not apply to decentralized P2P servers be-
cause they "lack the control required" over the users on their site who
share copyrighted material.130 The Grokster court also applied a "bal-
ancing test;" having balanced the technological and financial benefits
of the service provider against the detriment of the copyright
holder.131
122. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005).
("[Olne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties.").
123. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1038 (C.D. Cal. 2003) ("The question, however, is
whether actual knowledge of specific infringement accrues at a time when either [d]efendant
materially contributes to the alleged infringement, and can therefore do something about it.").
124. Id.
125. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005).
("[Olne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties.").
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 939.
129. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004)
130. Id.
131. Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1038 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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On an appeal from MGM, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed The
Ninth Circuit's decision and held Grokster liable for copyright in-
fringement after applying the "inducement theory." 132 The Court said
Sony v. Universal did not preclude inculpating intent if there was evi-
dence available to demonstrate that a software distributor should be
liable.133 In Sony v. Universal, the question before the court was
whether Sony's sale of "Betamax" videotape recorders ("VTR") to
the general public constituted contributory copyright infringement.13 4
Those who owned a "Betamax" VTR had the ability to record Uni-
versal's copyrighted works, fast-forward, rewind, and shift the time
they wanted to watch the content. 35 The Supreme Court ultimately
held Sony not liable for contributory copyright infringement.13 6 JUS-
tice Stevens delivered the Opinion, harkening to the district court's
reasoning that the sale of copyright equipment does not constitute
contributory copyright infringement if the product is widely used for
legitimate, unobjectionable purposes, or, indeed, is merely capable of
substantial non-infringing uses.' 37
Using the reasoning in Sony, the Court in MGM v. Grokster ulti-
mately applied the "inducement theory," finding a third party liable
for contributory copyright infringement if it promotes the use of its
tool to infringe copyright "as shown by clear expression or other af-
firmative steps."138 Grokster's software induced copyright infringe-
ment and evidence showed that actual infringement did occur.139 The
evidence showed that Grokster actively induced known copyright in-
fringers from Napster to join its network.140 Additionally, email corre-
spondence between Grokster's high level officers demonstrated the
assent between the officers that "if copyrighted material were availa-
ble for download, higher revenues would ensue for increased user
traffic."1 41 Further, Grokster provided guides instructing users on how
to upload infringing material when placed on notice by rightful copy-
right holders, and failed to take any steps necessary to remove the
132. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935 (2005).
133. Id.
134. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984).
135. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 423.
136. Id. at 498.
137. Id. at 441-42; Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912); Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448
U.S. 176, 100 S. Ct. 2601, 65 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1980); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441-42 (1984)
138. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940 (2005).
139. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 940.
140. Id.
141. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 950 (2005).
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infringing material or block the material from being downloaded by
other users.142 Sufficient evidence showed that Grokster had and used
that knowledge of infringing material for its own financial benefit at
the detriment of the copyright holders and was found liable to MGM
for contributory copyright infringement.143
G. In re: Aimster and the Costs-Benefits Analysis as it Applies to
ISPs' Broadcasts of Live Sports Events
Federal courts have moved toward a cost-benefit analysis after it
was first applied in In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation.144 Recording
industries brought both contributory and vicarious copyright infringe-
ment claims against an Internet website operator.145 Chief Judge Pos-
ner granted the plaintiff's preliminary injunction to enjoin the way the
ISP operated.146 Judge Posner held Aimster did not meet the prereq-
uisites to receive protection under the DMCA safe harbor provision
because the company had not taken "reasonable measures" under
Section 512(i)'s requirement to "establish a policy to terminate repeat
infringers and instead even encouraged repeat infringement."1 47 This
can rise to the level of intent, where it is virtually impossible to con-
ceive of a situation where an ISP is not "financially benefiting" from
recurring copyright protected material available for viewer-ship on its
website.
1. Application of In re Aimster to Live Spectator Sports Events
It will be difficult for a court to rule an ISP must take down copy-
righted material uploaded on to it, even when the correct copyright
owner is uncertain. It is still unclear as to who the correct legal copy-
right holder of a live spectator sports event is when it is uploaded by a
spectator who taped a segment, or the entire sports event, while in
attendance. It may take several years coupled with several court deci-
sions to definitively balance all of the competing interests.
If future courts hold that the rightful copyright holder of live sports
events, the actual competition as opposed to circumstances that could
be deemed "facts" or "news" (the car crash example discussed when
the spectator filmed a segment of the Daytona 500) the interests
would most likely balance in favor of the ISP as opposed to in copy-
142. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 960 (2005).
143. Id.
144. In re Airnster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
145. Id.
146. In re Airnster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 656 (7th Cir. 2003).
147. Id. at 655.
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right holder the sole spectator. If the person who recorded the event
is deemed the copyright owner and that material is uploaded, he or
she would suffer minimal financial consequences. It may be consid-
ered "undue hardship" for an ISP to implement "take-down or block-
ing" procedures for copyright-protected content every time a
copyright owner (the spectators) uploads content. It is moot whether
the ISP is a centralized or decentralized distributor. One issue usually
addressed with decentralized distributors is inconsistent policies and
procedures. However, this may be irrelevant in balancing competing
interests of the ISP benefiting commercially at the detriment of the
copyright holders. Decentralized distributors have different points of
control and policy, but when these multiple points are working to-
gether for their own commercial benefit, this may be no different than
one "centralized" point, and should therefore be held equally liable.
An advantage for ISPs allowing access infringed content is the ad-
vertisements partnerships they can foster due to the voluminous user
activity on their websites. Corporate sponsors recognize users' free
viewership when visiting the ISPs' websites. For instance, Youtube
provides corporate sponsors' advertisements on the "loading" screen
of the selected videos. Corporate sponsors pay for the advertising air
time varying from 20 to 90 seconds, depending on their desired expo-
sure. These agreements with advertisers and sponsors are consistent
revenue-generators for ISPs.
However, the analysis will be different in the future if courts con-
sistently hold that the sports sanctioning bodies are the legal copyright
holders of the live spectator sports events, even if spectators film por-
tions of events on their cell phones and upload the content onto ISPs.
"Non-statutory labor" exemption professional sports leagues, i.e.
leagues that have a collective bargaining agreement between the
league and a player's union (such as the NBA, NFL, NHL, MLB),
have large endorsements and television contracts. Included in the en-
dorsement contracts, sponsors attach themselves to equipment,
uniforms, arenas and merchandise of the respective leagues. Further,
these contracts allow the sponsors to advertise their brand on national
and local television networks. Sponsors will get massive exposure
from consumers seeing the sponsors' commercial advertisements dur-
ing the sports events on television.
Sports sanctioning bodies such as NASCAR, the PGA, and ATP
tennis will be even more affected because the sports events are prima-
rily financed by corporate sponsors. A sharp decline in consumer at-
tendance or viewership may result in the loss of future agreements
with corporate sponsors. Additionally, corporate sponsors that are
1252014]
126 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 10:105
currently under contract may try to breach it because it sees little re-
turn on investment due to the loss of consumer viewership of the live
events.
The ISPs' interest is similar to that of the leagues and sanctioning
bodies; consumer viewership directly leads to contracts with corporate
sponsors. However, if a future court were to hold that leagues and
sanctioning bodies are the copyright owners of all occurrences at their
live sports events, whether a regular part of the game or not, the ISPs'
"corporate sponsorship agreement" benefit is outweighed by the det-
riment the sports leagues and sanctioning bodies would suffer.
All issues related to ISPs' copyright infringement liability of live
spectator sports events are costly. Attorneys' fees that result from first
determining the copyright holder, and second determining copyright
infringement culpability of ISPs, decreases the ISPs' business effi-
ciency. Sports leagues and sanctioning bodies will also suffer finan-
cially due to the potential years of litigation.
No solutions are available that would mutually benefit all parties or
prevent costly litigation. The following solutions have been lobbied by
Congress in order to both adapt to technological advancement and
Internet expansion, and mutually benefit all parties involved in these
copyright legal questions.
III. SOLUTIONS
A. Solutions Lobbied by Congress
1. Partnerships
ISPs continue to benefit financially from the infringing material on
their servers, even though this benefit belongs to the copyright own-
ers.148 A possible solution to the issue between copyright owners and
ISPs promotes partnerships or agreements between the two, which
will ultimately allow both parties to profit from the material.149 YOU-
tube's website has a partnership program in place where qualified
copyright owners collaborate with the ISP to create "channels."150
None of the partnerships are with any sports leagues or sanctioning
bodies but rather with companies involved in the music entertainment
148. Anna Katz, Copyright in Cyberspace: Why Owners Should Bear the Burden of Identifying
Infringing Materials Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 18 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 343,
344 (2012).
149. Mark Harrington, Online Copyright Infringement Liability for Internet Service Providers:
Context, Cases & Recently Enacted Legislation, BC.EDU (Jun. 4, 1999), http://www.bc.edu/bc-
org/avp/law/st org/iptflarticles/content/1999060401.html.
150. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
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industry.151 The owners of these channels share in the profits YouTube
makes off of the advertisements posted to these channels. 152 One of
the more well-known channels is the music channel, Vevo, LLC
("VEVO").153 VEVO is a video hosting service owned and operated
by a joint venture of Universal Music Group, Google Inc., Sony Music
Entertainment, and Abu Dhabi Media. 154 EMI Records licensed its
content to the service before being purchased by Universal Music
group in 2012.155 It was launched on December 8, 2009.156 VEVO's
videos are sold to other companies across the web,' 57 one of which is a
partnership with Google Inc., where VEVO and Google Inc. split the
advertising revenues generating from consumer traffic from VEVO's
music video played on Google's owned service, Youtube.s58 This part-
nership between VEVO and Google Inc. demonstrates how promi-
nent names can partner together to maximize profits.'59 Google
benefits from VEVO's music videos because YouTube's users prefer
the high-quality video on the VEVO channel as opposed to the poorer
quality infringing videos.160 The owners of VEVO benefit from the
partnership because it increases the exposure and viewer-ship its
videos receive.161
There is a problem with the "partnership agreements" as it relates
to live spectator sports events. The users that search videos on You-
Tube or other ISPs for sports material are usually looking for a short
video segment rather than a full length live sports event.162 The part-
nership between YouTube and VEVO works because of the content
VEVO provides. VEVO is exclusively a music entertainment channel
that rebroadcasts music videos over the Internet. 163 The music videos
last for the duration of the song.. .only about three to five minutes.164
Compare that to two sports events where the average of full length
151. Id.
152. Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
153. Partner with YouTube, YotrrUBE, http://www.YouTube.com/partners.
154. Id.
155. Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX Inc., 683 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2012).
156. Id.
157. Carr, Austin. Vevo CEO on MTV, Jersey Shore, Google TV, Music Videos. Fast Corn-
pany.corn, October 27, 2010.
158. Vevo Quickly Dominates Online Music Videos, BLOGGERSBLOG,(Jan. 21, 2010), http://
www.bloggersblog.comlvevo-quickly-dominates-online-music-videos-121101.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Wiser, supra note 1, at 63.
162. Wiser, supra note 1, at 63-64.
163. Vevo Quickly Dominates Online Music Videos, BLOGGERSILOG,(Jan. 21, 2010), http://
www.bloggersblog.com/vevo-quickly-dominates-online-music-videos-121 101.
164. Id.
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sports events are between 2.5 to 3 hours. The users of ISPs are looking
for that winning touchdown, slam dunk or home run that only lasts a
few seconds, not to watch a full game. In the time being it is difficult
for corporations, who own the television rights to broadcast live spec-
tator sports events, to partner with an ISP, either Youtube or an ISP
similar to the operations of Youtube, to develop channels and only
select certain clips to be placed on their specific channel.165 There
would be nothing "easy" about executing such agreements. 166 It would
be pain-staking every time to determine exactly which type of mate-
rial would be encompassed by the agreements, which material is se-
lected, and to what duration that material will be protected.
2. Insurers for Large ISPs
A novel idea for ISPs to protect themselves from lawsuits initiated
by copyright holders is Internet Insurance. As previously stated, the
ISP may not in itself be infringing, but if one of its users engages in
infringing activity, the ISP can be liable for contributory or vicarious
copyright infringement.167 With the expansion of Internet and the
great potential for lawsuits to arise, ISPs will inevitably need some-
where to turn to protect their financial interests. For instance, suppose
a case reached a court that involved a lucrative ISP such as YouTube,
where it was being sued for billions of dollars in damages. If a court
held YouTube liable, such a ruling could result in severe financial con-
sequences for YouTube, including bankruptcy. A situation as such is
likely to occur due to the endless infringing material placed on ISPs.
As noted in a Pace University Law Review article that covered the
futuristic nature of the Internet's relationship with the DMCA, the
current field of protection afforded to ISPs comprises:
Any content on websites has the potential to raise issues about cop-
yright and trademark infringement and defamation and invasion of
privacy issues. Often an offline liability policy will not cover online
applications. Sites that provide information such as financial infor-
mation, health-related information, and virtually any sort of infor-
mation that visitors may rely on can be subject to claims. These
claims against the owner can arise whether the owner is the creator
of that content or a licensee of some third party content. As with
the offline world, any acquisition agreements with writers, artists,
licensors, and other should contain appropriate warranties and in-
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Wiser, supra note 1, at 34.
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demnities but these are often illusory if the warrantor has no or
little assets to protect the owner. The need for insurance arises.168
For persons to protect themselves from major financial hits, insur-
ance companies are readily available that act as protective umbrellas
to allow people to take those risks.169 It allows a person to pay an
insurance company a premium to collect a certain amount of money
to collect a specified amount from the company if the event specified
in the insurance policy occurs.170 The policy amount is calculated by
the insurance company for taking on the financial risk.' 7 ' Several
United States insurance companies and underwriters in the London
market have issued policies providing first and third party insurance
coverage to meet the market demand.172 Policyholders have readily
increased their presence on the Internet as more insurers are entering
the field and establishing themselves as solely Internet-specific poli-
cies or custom endorsements.17 3
Internet Insurance will not immediately come to fruition as a main-
stay in America. Internet insurance must differ from most other insur-
ances. Insurance companies use algorithms based on the members in
an insured pool and the likelihood that the number of actual losses
will be close to the number of expected losses. 174 A few Internet insur-
ance policies have flourished but none have set the industry standard
in the average amount an ISP can expect when purchasing such
insurance. 175
Insurance companies may be too overwhelmed by the potential
losses ISPs could subject themselves to copyright infringement suits. It
has been suggested that a system similar to that of the Securities In-
vestor Protection Corporation ("SIPC") would make good sense.'76
SIPC is the first line of defense in the event a brokerage firm fails and
owes customers cash and securities that are missing from customer
168. Ivan Hoffman, Online Liability Insurance, IOFFMAN.COM, http://www.ivanhoffman.com/
onlineinsurance.html, (last accessed Jan 1, 2014). Wiser, Luciano, Psihoules, Lopez. The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act: The Future of the Safe Harbor Provision. Pace IP., Sports & En-
tertainment L. Form. Vol. 1, Issue 1 Spring 2011 Art. 3. http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1003&context=pipself.
169. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2010).
170. Id.
171. Everson v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, 898 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Ohio 1994)
172. Christine M. McMillan, Federal Flood Insurance Policy: Making Matters Worse, 44 Hous.
L. Rev. 471, 474 (2007).
173. Id.
174. How Does Insurance Work?, SUPER PAGI-s, http://www.superpages.com/supertips/how-
does-insurance-work.html.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 228. See also SIPC: Who We Are, SECURITIES INVESTrOR PROTECTION CORPORA-
TION, http://www.sipc.org/How/Covers.aspx.
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accounts.' 77 If there was a regulatory body similar to the SIPC for
ISPs, it could operate similarly.178 The new model would allow for
ISPs to contribute a specific percentage of revenue annually to the
regulating body.17 9 This idea is in an early stage but Congress is creat-
ing legislation for this new "Internet fund".
Court cases that have dealt with ISPs and their relation to the
DMCA forced Congress to lobby ways that allows ISPs to take risks in
line with continuous Internet expansion and contemporaneously pro-
tect the rights of copyright owners. 180 Insurance companies would cal-
culate probabilities with statistical analysis, similar to how other types
of insurance policies are calculated and used as a premium. However,
even if a traditional insurance premium model coupled with Congress'
idea of an "Internet Fund," is implemented, the willingness for insur-
ance companies to provide premiums to big market ISPs is speculative
at best.' 8 The ability to insure ISPs will in theory give ISPs incentive
to innovate and expand. This may take several years, and different
courts' interpretations of like policies could vary by millions of
dollars.182
These questions remain unanswered but play an intricate role for
the possibility of implementing Internet insurance policies and an "In-
ternet Fund." Both have been lobbied by Congress and will be further
discussed because they will mutually benefit ISPs and copyright
owners.
B. The Future of the "balancing interests" of ISPs' Expansion and
A Copyright Holder's Protected Rights
The solutions discussed will only be successful if future courts' de-
cide definitively who the correct copyright holders are regarding live
sports events and what occurrences in sports events are "facts" or
"news." If ISPs purchase Insurance policies and distribute revenue to
177. How SIPC Protects You: Understanding the Securities Investor Protection Corporation,
SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECIlON CORPORATION, http://www.sipc.org/how/brochure.aspx
(2013).
178. SIPC Protection Versus Federal Deposit Insurance, INTEGRATED PUBLISHING, http://www
.tpub.com/content/cg2001/dO1653/dO16530021.htm
179. Id. The actual language is as follows: Annual assessments on all member firms - periodi-
cally set by SIPC and interest generated from its investments in U.S. Treasury notes. If the SIPC
fund becomes or appears to be insufficient to carry out the purposes of Securities Investor Pro-
tection Act (SIPA), SIPC may borrow up to $1 billion from the U.S. Treasury through SEC (i.e.,
SEC would borrow the funds from the U.S. Treasury and then re-lend them to SIPC). In addi-
tion, SIPC has a $1 billion line of credit with a consortium of banks.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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an "Internet Fund," the Internet business model will change forever.
Would there be any reason for a sports enthusiast to attend a live
sports event anymore? In theory, ticket sales will drop and ISPs reve-
nue will continue to sky rocket.
Further, ISPs will take new risks knowing insurers will cover them
with respect to copyright lawsuits. The willingness for these compa-
nies to allow any material on the Internet from their users will destroy
the market for sports leagues and sanctioning bodies.
The current state of ISPs' "easily attainable" immunity from copy-
right infringement liability has been awarded by the courts. The evolu-
tion of ISPs' copyright immunity under the DMCA's safe harbor
provision and future court decisions of the legal copyright owners or
live sports events, if filmed and retransmitted onto ISPs, determine
how ISPs' must create their business models in conjugate with using
"free viewer-ship" of live spectator sports events.
IV. CONCLUSION
Technological advancement has made it difficult to strike down big
market ISPs that have taken advantage of this opportunity and has
given ISPs copyright infringement immunity, even though most have
knowledge of protected content on their server available for "free
viewer-ship." The music and entertainment industry has failed in the
past to argue its detriment from this in court. Sports leagues and
sports sanctioning bodies are a unique animal; sports are unpredict-
able, and ticket sales are important for the financial stability of all
sports entities.
Legal questions surrounding copyright and live spectator sports
events are to date unanswered. Who is the copyright holder? What
material should be outside the scope of the live sports events? "Facts"
and "news" are granted First Amendment Protection for copyright
ownership, what aspects of sports events will be constitutionally pro-
tected? Courts' answers to these questions should be answered before
Congress chooses to enact legislation addressing these issues.
Insurance policies that use the same statistical analysis as other
types of insurance coupled with an "Internet fund" similar to the SIPC
to mutually benefit the ISPs and the copyright holders. Internet ex-
pansion incentivizes ISPs to take risks for advancing its business, but
questions remain whether it can proceed at the detriment of undeter-
mined copyright owners, and this determination will directly affect
ISPs' advancement and the future relationship between copyright and
all parties involved.
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